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Abstract
We study a multistage, quality-then-price game between a public rm and a private rm. The market
consists of a set of consumers who have di¤erent quality valuations. The public rm aims to maximize social
surplus, whereas the private rm maximizes prot. In the rst stage, both rms simultaneously choose
qualities. In the second stage, both rms simultaneously choose prices. Consumersquality valuations are
drawn from a general distribution. Each rms unit production cost is an increasing and convex function
of quality. There are multiple equilibria. In some, the public rm chooses a low quality, and the private
rm chooses a high quality. In others, the opposite is true. We characterize subgame-perfect equilibria.
Equilibrium qualities are often ine¢ cient, but under some conditions on consumer valuation distribution,
equilibrium qualities are rst best. Various policy implications are drawn.
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rm, mixed oligopoly
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1 Introduction
Public and private rms compete in many markets. In many countries, general education, health care
services and transportation are provided by public and private rms in various degrees. In higher education,
most universities in Europe and Asia are public, but in the United States the market is a mixed oligopoly.
Furthermore, in di¤erent markets in the U.S., quality segmentation varies. The best universities in the
U.S. Northeast are private, but many public universities in California and the western states have higher
quality than private colleges (see Deming and Goldin (2012)). In health care, again, many European markets
are dominated by public rms, but in many countries the private market is very active. Again, quality
segmentation di¤ers. For example, in the U.S., according to the U.S. News ranking in 2016-2017, four out
of the ve best U.S. hospitals were private. However, it has been well documented that U.S. public nursing
homes have higher quality than private nursing homes (see Comondore et al. (2009)).
Quality is a major concern in these markets. The interest in quality stems from a fundamental point
made by Spence (1975). Because a goods quality benets all buyers, the social benet of quality is the
sum of consumersvaluations. At a social optimum, the average consumer quality valuation should be equal
to the quality marginal cost. Yet, a prot-maximizing rm is only concerned with the consumer who is
indi¤erent between buying and not. A rms choice of quality will be one that maximizes the surplus of this
marginal consumer. The classic Spence (1975) result says that even when products are priced at marginal
costs, their qualities will be ine¢ cient. We show that a mixed oligopoly may be a mechanism for remedying
this ine¢ ciency.
We use a standard model of vertical product di¤erentiation. In the rst stage, two rms simultaneously
choose product qualities. In the second stage, rms simultaneously choose product prices. Consumers
quality valuations are drawn from a general distribution. The two rms have access to the same technology.
The only di¤erence from the textbook setup is that one is a social-surplus maximizing public rm, whereas
the other remains a prot-maximizing private rm. Surprisingly, this single di¤erence has many implications.
First, the model exhibits multiple equilibria: in some equilibria, the public rms product quality is
higher than the private rms, but in others, the opposite is true. These multiple equilibria illustrate the
1
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variety of quality segmentations in the markets mentioned above. Second, and more important, we present
general conditions on consumersquality-valuation distribution under which qualities in low-public-quality
equilibria are e¢ cient, as well as general conditions under which qualities in high-public-quality equilibria
are e¢ cient. When equilibrium qualities are ine¢ cient, deviations from the rst best go in tandem: either
qualities in public and private rms are both below the corresponding rst-best levels, or they are both
above. Equilibrium qualities form a rich set, and we have constructed examples with many congurations.
Our analysis proceeds in the standard way. Given a subgame dened by a pair of qualities, we nd
the equilibrium prices. Then we solve for equilibrium qualities, letting rms anticipate that their quality
choices lead to continuation equilibrium prices. In the pricing subgame, qualities are given. The public
rms objective is to maximize social surplus, so its price best response must achieve the e¢ cient allocation
of consumers across the two rms. This requires that consumers fully internalize the cost di¤erence between
high and low qualities. The public rm sets its price in order that the di¤erence in prices is exactly the
di¤erence in quality costs. The private rms best response is the typical inverse demand elasticity rule.
When rms choose qualities, they anticipate equilibrium prices in the next stage. Given the private rms
quality, the public rm chooses its quality to maximize social surplus, anticipating the equilibrium consumer
assignment among rms in the next stage. The private rm, however, will try to manipulate the equilibrium
prices through its quality. Without any price response from the public rm, the private rm would have
chosen the quality that would be optimal for the marginal consumer, as in Spence (1975). A larger quality
di¤erence, however, would be preferred because that would raise the private rms price. Because of the price
manipulation, the private rms equilibrium quality is one that maximizes the utility of an inframarginal
consumer, not the utility of the marginal consumer.
In the rst best, the socially e¢ cient qualities are determined by equating average consumer valuations
and marginal cost of quality. The surprise is that in contrast to private duopoly, the private rms equilibrium
quality choice may coincide with the rst-best quality. In other words, the inframarginal consumer whose
utility is being maximized by the private rm happens to have the average valuation among the private
rms customers.
2
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The (su¢ cient) conditions for rst-best equilibria refer to the consumersquality-valuation distribution.
In equilibria where the public rm produces at a low quality, equilibrium qualities are rst best when the
valuation distribution has a linear inverse hazard rate.1 In equilibria where the public rm produces at a
high quality, equilibrium qualities are rst best when the valuation distribution has a linear inverse reverse
hazard rate. The linear inverse hazard and inverse reverse hazard rate conditions are equivalent to the private
rms marginal revenue function being linear in consumer valuation. Nevertheless, linear inverse hazard and
inverse reverse hazard rates are special. A generic valuation distribution violates linearity. In an ine¢ cient
equilibrium, both rmsqualities are either too high or too low relative to the rst best. This is in sharp
contrast to the private duopoly in which excessive quality di¤erentiation is used to relax price competition.
We draw various policy implications from our results. First, if a public rm is to take over a private
one in a duopoly, should it enter in the high-quality or low-quality segment of the market? High-public-
quality equilibria and low-public-quality equilibria generate di¤erent social surpluses. Second, our use of a
social-welfare objective function for the public rm can be regarded as making a normative point. If the
public rm aims to maximize only consumer surplus, it will subscribe to marginal-cost pricing. Because
the private rm never prices at marginal cost, equilibrium-price di¤erence between rms will never be equal
to the quality-cost di¤erence, so consumer assignments across rms will never be e¢ cient. A social-welfare
objective does mean that the public rm tolerates high prices. However, our policy recommendation is that
undesirable e¤ects from high prices should be remedied by a tax credit or subsidy to consumers regardless
of from where they purchase.
Our research contributes to the literature of mixed oligopolies. We use the classical model of quality-price
competition in Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979, 1986) and Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983). However, the mixed
oligopoly literature revolves around the theme that a public rm may improve welfare. Grilo (1994) studies
a mixed duopoly in the vertical di¤erentiation framework. In her model, consumersvaluations of qualities
follow a uniform distribution. The unit cost of production may be convex or concave in quality. The paper
derives rst-best equilibria. In a Hotelling, horizontal di¤erentiation model with quadratic transportation
1See Lemmas 3 and 6 below. If F denotes the distribution, and f the density, then the inverse hazard rate is
1  F
f
, and the inverse reverse hazard rate is
F
f
.
3
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cost, Cremer et al. (1991) show that a public rm improves welfare when the total number of rms is
either two, or more than six. Also using a Hotelling model, Matsumura and Matsushima (2004) show that
mixed oligopoly gives some cost-reduction incentives. In a Cournot model, Cremer et al. (1989) show the
disciplinary e¤ect of replacing some private rms by public enterprises. Comparing Cournot and Bertrand
models in mixed market, Ghosh and Mitra (2010) show that the results from private Cournot-Bertrand
comparisons do not hold when a private rm is replaced by a welfare-maximizing public rm. Our paper is
consistent with these results. However, we use a general consumer valuation distribution and cost function,
and present multiple equilibria, which have not been the focus in the literature.
For prot-maximizing rms, Cremer and Thisse (1991) show that, under very mild conditions on trans-
portation costs, horizontal di¤erentiation models are actually a special case of vertical product di¤erentiation
(see also Champsaur and Rochet (1989)). The isomorphism can be transferred to mixed duopolies. The key
in the Cremer-Thisse (1991) proof is that demands in horizontal models can be translated into equivalent de-
mands in vertical models. Firmsobjectives are unimportant. Hence, results in horizontal mixed oligopolies
do relate to vertical mixed oligopolies. In most horizontal di¤erentiation models, consumers are assumed
to be uniformly distributed on the product space, and the transportation or mismatch costs are quadratic.
These assumptions translate to a uniform distribution of consumer quality valuations and a quadratic quality
cost function in vertical di¤erentiation models.
The rst-best results in Grilo (1994) are related to the e¢ cient equilibria in the two-rm case in Cremer
et al. (1991) because both papers use the uniform distribution for consumer valuations. By contrast, we
use a general distribution for consumer valuation. Our results simultaneously reveal the limitation of the
uniform distribution and which properties of the uniform distribution (linear inverse hazard and linear inverse
reverse hazard rates) have been the driver of earlier results. Furthermore, when consumer valuations follow
a uniform distribution, the issue of multiple equilibria is moot for a duopoly. By contrast, we show that
multiple equilibria are important for general distributions. Moreover, our equilibrium qualities translate to
equilibrium locations under general consumer distributions on the Hotelling line.
For private rms, Anderson et al. (1997) give the rst characterization for a general location distribution
4
Page 6 of 39
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
with quadratic transportation costs. Our techniques are consistent with those in Anderson et al. (1997),
but we use a general cost function. A recent paper by Benassi et al. (2006) uses a symmetric trapezoid
valuation distribution and explores consumersnonpurchase options. Yurko (2011) works with lognormal
distributions. Our monotone inverse hazard and inverse reverse hazard rate assumptions are valid under the
trapezoid distribution, but invalid under lognormal distributions.
Qualities in mixed provisions are often discussed in the education and health sectors. However, per-
spectives such as political economy, taxation, and income redistribution are incorporated, so public rms
typically are assumed to have objective functions di¤erent from social welfare. Brunello and Rocco (2008)
combine consumers voting and quality choices by public and private schools, and let the public school be
a Stackelberg leader. Epple and Romano (1998) consider vouchers and peer e¤ects but use a competitive
model for interaction between public and private schools. (For recent surveys on education and health care,
see Urquiola (2016) and Barros and Siciliani (2012).) Grassi and Ma (2011, 2012) present models of publicly
rationed supply and private rm price responses under public commitment and noncommitment. Our results
here indicate that commitment may not be necessary, and imperfectly competitive markets may sometimes
yield e¢ cient qualities.
Privatization has been a policy topic in mixed oligopolies. Ishibashi and Kaneko (2008) set up a mixed
duopoly with price and quality competition. The model has both horizontal and vertical di¤erentiation.
However, all consumers have the same valuation on quality, and are uniformly distributed on the horizontal
product space (as in Ma and Burgess (1993)). They show that the government should manipulate the
objective of the public rm so that it maximizes a weighted sum of prot and social welfare, a form of partial
privatization. (Using a Cournot model, Matsumura (1998) earlier demonstrates that partial privatization is a
valuable policy.) Our model is richer on the vertical dimension, but consists of no horizontal di¤erentiation.
Our policy implication has a privatization component to it, but a simple social welfare objective for the
public rm is su¢ cient.
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 studies equilibria in which the public rms quality is lower than
the private rms, and Section 4 studies the opposite case. In each section, we rst derive subgame-perfect
5
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equilibrium prices, and then equilibrium qualities. We present a characterization of equilibrium qualities,
and conditions for equilibrium qualities to be rst best. Section 5 considers policies, various robustness
issues, and existence of equilibria. We consider alternative preferences for the public rm. We also let cost
functions of the rms be di¤erent. Then we let consumers have outside options, and introduce multiple
private rms. Finally we consider existence of equilibria. The last section presents some concluding remarks.
Proofs are collected in the Appendix. Details of numerical computation are in the Supplement.
2 The model
2.1 Consumers
There is a set of consumers with total mass normalized at 1. Each cons mer would like to receive one
unit of a good or service. In our context, it is helpful to think of such goods and services as education,
transportation, and health care including child care, medical, and nursing home services. The public sector
often participates actively in these markets.
A good has a quality, denoted by q, which is assumed to be positive. Each consumer has a valuation of
quality v. This valuation varies among consumers. We let v be a random variable dened on the positive
support [v; v] with distribution F and strictly positive density f . We also assume that f is continuously
di¤erentiable.
We will use two properties of the distribution, namely [1   F ]=f  h, and F=f  k. We assume
that h is decreasing, and that k is increasing, so h0(v) < 0 and k0(v) > 0. The assumptions ensure that
prot functions, to be dened below, are quasi-concave, and are implied by f being logconcave (Anderson
et al. (1997)). These monotonicity assumptions are satised by many common distributions such as the
uniform, the exponential, the beta, etc. (Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2004)). We call h the inverse hazard rate
(because 1=h is the hazard), and k the inverse reverse hazard rate (because 1=k is the reverse hazard).
Valuation variations among consumers have the usual interpretation of preference diversity due to wealth,
taste, or cultural di¤erences. We may call a consumer with valuation v a type-v consumer, or simply consumer
v. If a type-v consumer purchases a good with quality q at price p, his utility is vq p. The quasi-linear utility
6
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function is commonly adopted in the literature (see, for example, the standard texts Anderson et al. (1992)
and Tirole (1988)).
We assume that each consumer will buy a unit of the good. This can be made explicit by postulating
that each good o¤ers a su¢ ciently high benet which is independent of v, or that the minimum valuation v is
su¢ ciently high. The full-market coverage assumption is commonly used in the extant literature of product
di¤erentiation (either horizontal or vertical), but Delbono et al. (1996) and Benassi et al. (2016) have explored
the implications of consumer outside options, and we defer to Subsection 5.4 for more discussions. Relatedly,
the introduction of a public rm may be a policy for market expansion. We ignore this consideration by the
full-market coverage assumption.
2.2 Public and private rms
There are two rms, Firm 1 and Firm 2, and they have the same technology. Production requires a xed
cost. The implicit assumption is that the xed cost is so high that entries by many rms cannot be sustained.
We focus on the case of a mixed oligopoly so we do not consider the rather trivial case of two public rms.
Often a mixed oligopoly is motivated by a more e¢ cient private sector, so in Subsection 5.3 we let rms
have di¤erent technologies, and will explain how our results remain robust.
The variable, unit production cost of the good at quality q is c(q), where c : R+ ! R+ is a strictly
increasing and strictly convex function. A higher quality requires a higher unit cost, which increases at an
increasing rate. We also assume that c is twice di¤erentiable, and that it satises the usual Inada conditions:
limq!0+ c(q) = limq!0+ c0(q) = 0, so both rms always will be active.
Firm 1 is a public rm, and its objective is to maximize social surplus; the discussion of a general objective
function for the public rm is deferred until Subsection 5.2. Firm 2 is a prot-maximizing private rm. Each
rm chooses its product quality and price. We let p1 and q1 denote Firm 1s price and quality; similarly, p2
and q2 denote Firm 2s price and quality. Given these prices and qualities, each consumer buys from the rm
that o¤ers the higher utility. A consumer chooses a rm with a probability equal to a half if he is indi¤erent
between them.
7
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Consider any (p1; q1) and (p2; q2), and dene bv by bvq1   p1 = bvq2   p2. Consumer bv is just indi¤erent
between purchasing from Firm 1 and Firm 2. If bv 2 [v; v], then the demands for the two rms are as follows:
Demand for Firm 1 Demand for Firm 2
F (bv) 1  F (bv) if q1 < q2
1  F (bv) F (bv) if q1 > q2
1=2 1=2 if q1 = q2
(1)
We sometimes call consumer bv the indi¤erent or marginal consumer. (Otherwise, if bv =2 [v; v], or fails to
exist, one rm will be unable to sell to any consumer.)
If Firm 1s product quality is lower than Firm 2s, its demand is F (bv) when its price is su¢ ciently lower
than Firm 2s price. Conversely, if Firm 2s price is not too high, then its demand is 1   F (bv). If the two
rmsproduct qualities are identical, then they must charge the same price if both have positive demands.
In this case, all consumers are indi¤erent between them, and each rm receives half of the market.
2.3 Allocation, social surplus, and rst best
An allocation consists of a pair of product qualities, one at each rm, and an assignment of consumers across
the rms. The social surplus from an allocation isZ v
v
[xq`   c(q`)]f(x)dx+
Z v
v
[xqh   c(qh)]f(x)dx: (2)
Here, the qualities at the two rms are q` and qh, q` < qh. Those consumers with valuations between v and
v get the good with quality q`, wh reas those with valuations between v and v get the good with quality qh.
The rst best is (q` ; q

h; v
) that maximizes (2), and is characterized by the following:Z v
v
xf(x)dx
F (v)
= c0(q` ) (3)Z v
v
xf(x)dx
1  F (v) = c
0(qh) (4)
vq`   c(q` ) = vqh   c(qh): (5)
In the characterization of the rst best in (3), (4), and (5), those consumers with lower valuations should
consume the good at a low quality (q` ), and those with higher valuations should consume at a high quality
8
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(qh). For the rst best, divide consumers into two groups: those with v 2 [v; v] and those with v 2 [v; v].
The (conditional) average valuation of consumers in [v; v] is in the left-hand side of (3), and, in the rst
best, this is equal to the marginal cost of the lower rst-best quality, the right-hand side of (3). A similar
interpretation applies to (4) for those consumers with higher valuations. Finally, the division of consumers
into the two groups is achieved by identifying consumer v who enjoys the same surplus from both qualities,
and this yields (5).
As Spence (1975) has shown, quality is like a public good, so the total social benet is the aggregate
consumer benet, and in the rst best, the average valuation should be equal to the marginal cost of quality.
As a result the indi¤erent consumer v actually receives too little surplus from q` because v > c0(q`), but too
much from qh because v < c0(qh). In a private duopoly, rms will choose qualities to relax price competition,
so one rms equilibrium quality will be lower than the rst best, whereas the other rms equilibrium quality
will be higher. Section 6 of Laine and Ma (2016), the working paper version, contains this result.2
2.4 Extensive form
We study subgame-perfect equilibria of the following game.
Stage 0: Nature draws consumersvaluations v and these are known to consumers only.
Stage 1: Firm 1 chooses a quality q1; simultaneously, Firm 2 chooses a quality q2.
Stage 2: Qualities in Stage 1 are common knowledge. Firm 1 chooses a price p1; simultaneously, Firm 2
chooses a price p2. Consumers then observe price-quality o¤ers and pick a rm for purchase.
An outcome of this game consists of rmsprices and qualities, (p1; q1) and (p2; q2), and the allocations
of consumers across the two rms. Subgames at Stage 2 are dened by the rms quality pair (q1; q2).
Subgame-perfect equilibrium prices in Stage 2 are those that are best responses in subgames dened by
(q1; q2). Finally, equilibrium qualities in Stage 1 are those that are best responses given that prices are given
by a subgame-perfect equilibrium in Stage 2.
2Also, the multiple-quality duopoly with general valuation distributions and cost functions in Barigozzi and Ma
(2016) can generate a special case for the single-quality duopoly with ine¢ cient equilibrium qualities.
9
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There are multiple equilibria. In one class of equilibria, in Stage 1 the public rm chooses low quality,
whereas the private rm chooses high quality, and in Stage 2, the public rm sets a low price, and the private
rm chooses a high price. In the other class, the roles of the rms, in terms of their ranking of qualities and
prices, are reversed. However, because the two rms have di¤erent objectives, equilibria in these two classes
yield di¤erent allocations.3
3 Equilibria with low quality at public rm
3.1 Subgame-perfect equilibrium prices
Consider subgames in Stage 2 dened by (q1; q2) with q1 < q2. According to (1), each rm will have a
positive demand only if p1 < p2, and there is ev 2 [v; v] with
evq1   p1 = evq2   p2 or ev(p1; p2; q1:q2) = p2   p1
q2   q1 ; (6)
where we have emphasized that ev, the consumer indi¤erent between buying from Firm 1 and Firm 2, depends
on qualities and prices. Expression (6) characterizes rmsdemand functions. Firm 1 and Firm 2spayo¤s
are, respectively,
Z ev
v
[xq1   c(q1)]f(x)dx+
Z v
ev [xq2   c(q2)]f(x)dx and (7)
[1  F (ev)][p2   c(q2)]: (8)
The expression in (7) is social surplus when consumers with valuations in [v; ev] buy from Firm 1, whereas
others buy from Firm 2. The prices that consumers pay to rms are transfers, so do not a¤ect social surplus.
The expression in (8) is Firm 2s prot.
Firm 1 chooses its price p1 to maximize (7) given the demand (6) and price p2. Firm 2 chooses price p2
to maximize (8) given the demand (6) and price p1. Equilibrium prices, (bp1; bp2), are best responses against
each other.
3These are all possible pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria. There is no equilibrium in which both rms
choose the same quality. Indeed, the unique continuation equilibrium of subgames with identical qualities is rms
setting price at the unit cost. Earning no prot, the private rm will deviate to another quality.
10
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Lemma 1 In subgames (q1; q2) with q1 < q2, and v <
c(q2)  c(q1)
q2   q1 < v, equilibrium prices (bp1; bp2) are:
bp1   c(q1) = bp2   c(q2) = (q2   q1)1  F (bv)
f(bv)  (q2   q1)h(bv); (9)
where bv = c(q2)  c(q1)
q2   q1 : (10)
In Lemma 1 the equilibrium price di¤erence across rms is the same as the cost di¤erence: bp2   bp1 =
c(q2)  c(q1). Also, Firm 2 makes a prot, and its price-cost margin is proportional to the quality di¤erential
and the inverse hazard rate h.
We explain the result as follows. Firm 1s payo¤ is social surplus, so it seeks the consumer assignment to
the two rms, ev, to maximize social surplus (7). This is achieved by getting consumers to fully internalize
the cost di¤erence between the high and low qualities. Therefore, given bp2, Firm 1 sets bp1 so that the price
di¤erential bp2   bp1 is equal to the cost di¤erential c(q2)  c(q1). In equilibrium, the indi¤erent consumer is
given by bvq1   c(q1) = bvq2   c(q2), which indicates an e¢ cient allocation in the quality subgame (q1; q2).
Firm 2 seeks to maximize prot. Given Firm 1s price bp1, Firm 2s optimal price follows the marginal-
revenue-marginal-cost calculus. For a unit increase in p2, the marginal loss is [p2   c(q2)]f(ev)=(q2   q1),
whereas the marginal gain is [1 F (ev)]. Therefore, prot maximization yields bp2 c(q2) = (q2 q1)1  F (bv)
f(bv) ,
the inverse elasticity rule for Firm 2s price-cost margin.4 Lemma 1 follows from these best responses.
The key point in Lemma 1 is that equilibrium market shares and prices can be determined separately.
Once qualities are given, Firm 1 will aim for the socially e¢ cient allocation, and it adjusts its price, given
Firm 2s price, to achieve that. Firm 2, on the other hand, aims to maximize prot so its best response
depends on Firm 1s price as well as the elasticity of demand. Firm 1 does make a prot, and we will return
to this issue in Subsection 5.2.
To complete the characterization of price equilibria, we consider subgames (q1; q2) with q1 < q2, and
either
c(q2)  c(q1)
q2   q1 < v or v <
c(q2)  c(q1)
q2   q1 . In the former case, Firm 1 would like to allocate all consumers
to Firm 2, whereas in the other case, Firm 1 would like to allocate all consumers to itself. In both cases,
there are multiple equilibrium prices. They take the form of high values of bp1 when all consumers go to
4Firm 2s demand is 1  F (ev). Hence, elasticity is d(1  F (ev))
dp2
p2
1  F (ev) =  q2   q1h(ev) p2.
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Firm 2, but low values of bp1 in the other. However, equilibria in the game must have two active rms, so
these subgames cannot arise in equilibrium.
The equilibrium prices (bp1; bp2) in (9) and (10) formally establish three functional relationships, those
that relate any qualities to equilibrium prices and allocation of consumers across rms. We can write them
as bp1(q1; q2), bp2(q1; q2), and bv(q1; q2)  ev(bp1(q1; q2); bp2(q1; q2); q1; q2). We di¤erentiate (9) with bv in (10) to
determine how equilibrium prices and market share change with qualities. As it turns out, we will only need
to use the information of how bp1(q1; q2) and bp2(q1; q2) change with q2.
Lemma 2 From the denition of (bp1; bp2) and bv in (9) and (10), we have bv increasing in q1 and q2, and
@bp1(q1; q2)
@q2
= h(bv) + h0(bv) [c0(q2)  bv] (11)
@bp2(q1; q2)
@q2
= c0(q2) + h(bv) + h0(bv) [c0(q2)  bv] : (12)
Lemma 2 describes how the equilibrium indi¤erent consumer changes with qualities, and the strategic
e¤ect of Firm 2s quality on Firm 1s price. The marginal consumer bv is dened by bvq1  c(q1) = bvq2  c(q2).
Because q1 < q2, if q1 increases, consumer bv strictly prefers to buy from Firm 1, as does consumer bv +  for
a small and positive . Next, suppose that q2 increases, consumer bv also strictly prefers to buy from Firm
1. The point is that quality q1 is too low for consumer bv but quality q2 is too high. An increase in q1 makes
Firm 1 more attractive to consumer bv, and an increase in q2 makes Firm 2 less attractive to him.
If Firm 2 increases its quality, it expects to lose market share. However, it does not mean that its prot
must decrease. From (8), Firm 2s prot is increasing in Firm 1s price.5 If in fact Firm 1 raises its price
against a higher q2, Firm 2 may earn a higher prot. In any case, because h is decreasing, and c0(q2) > bv,
according to Lemma 2, an increase in q2 may result in higher or lower equilibrium prices. The point is simply
that Firm 2 can inuence Firm 1s price response. Also, from the di¤erence between (12) and (11), Firm 2s
equilibrium price always increases at a higher rate than Firm 1s: @bp2=@q2   @bp1=@q2 = c0(q2).
5The partial derivative of (8) with respect to p1 is
f(ev)[p2   c(q2)]
q2   q1 > 0.
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3.2 Subgame-perfect equilibrium qualities
At qualities q1 and q2, the continuation equilibrium payo¤s for Firms 1 and 2 are, respectively,
Z bv(q1;q2)
v
[xq1   c(q1)]f(x)dx+
Z v
bv(q1;q2)[xq2   c(q2)]f(x)dx, and (13)
[1  F (bv(q1; q2))][bp2(q1; q2)  c(q2)]; (14)
where bp2 is Firm 2s equilibrium price and bv is the indi¤erent consumer from Lemma 1. Let (bq1; bq2) be the
equilibrium qualities. They are mutual best responses, given continuation equilibrium prices:
bq1 = argmax
q1
Z bv(q1;bq2)
v
[xq1   c(q1)]f(x)dx+
Z v
bv(q1;bq2)[xbq2   c(bq2)]f(x)dx (15)bq2 = argmax
q2
[1  F (bv(bq1; q2))][bp2(bq1; q2)  c(q2)]: (16)
A change in quality q1 has two e¤ects on social surplus (13). First, it directly changes vq1   c(q1), the
surplus of consumers who purchase the good at quality q1. Second, it changes the equilibrium prices and
the marginal consumer bv (hence market shares) in Stage 2. This second e¤ect is second order because the
equilibrium prices in Stage 2 maximize social surplus. Hence, the rst-order derivative of (13) with respect
to q1 is
R bv(q1;q2)
v
[x   c0(q1)]f(x)dx (although Firm 1s objective is to maximize social surplus of the entire
market).
Similarly, a change in quality q2 has two e¤ects on Firm 2s prot. First, it directly changes the marginal
consumers surplus bvq2   c(q2). Second, it changes the equilibrium prices and the marginal consumer. We
rewrite (16) as
[1  F (bv(q1; q2))] [bv(q1; q2)q2   c(q2)  bv(q1; q2)q1 + bp1(q1; q2)] (17)
because
bv(q1; q2) = ev(bp1(q1; q2); bp2(q1; q2); q1; q2)  bp2(q1; q2)  bp1(q1; q2)
q2   q1 ; (18)
which gives the channels for the inuence of q2 on prices. Firm 2s equilibrium price in Stage 2 maximizes
prot, so the e¤ect of q2 on prot in (17) via bv(q1; q2) has a second-order e¤ect. Therefore, the rst-order
derivative of (17) with respect to quality q2 is bv(q1; q2)   c0(q2) + @bp1(q1; q2)
@q2
(where we have omitted the
factor [1  F (bv(q1; q2))]).
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We set the rst-order derivatives of social surplus with respect to q1 and of prot with respect to q2 to
zero. Then we apply (11) in Lemma 2 to obtain the following.
Proposition 1 Equilibrium qualities (bq1,bq2), and the marginal consumer bv solve the following three equations
in q1, q2, and v R v
v
xf(x)dx
F (v)
= c0(q1)
v +
h(v)
1  h0(v) = c
0(q2)
vq2   c(q2) = vq1   c(q1):
Firm 1s objective is to maximize social surplus. However, given Firm 2s quality and the continuation
equilibrium prices, the assignment of consumers across rms will always be e¢ cient. Therefore, Firm 1s
return to quality q1 consists of the benets of its own consumers. Hence bq1 equates the conditional average
valuation of consumers in [v; bv], R bvv xf(x)dx
F (bv) , and the marginal cost c0(q1). This is the rst equation.
Firm 2s quality will a¤ect Firm 1s price in Stage 2. If this were not the case (imagine that @bp1=@q2 were
0), the prot-maximizing quality would be the optimal level for the marginal consumer: bv = c0(q), reminiscent
of the basic property of quality in Spence (1975). By raising quality from one satisfying bv = c0(q), Firm 2
may also raise Firm 1s price, hence its own prot. This is a rst-order gain. The optimal tradeo¤ is now
given by bv+ @bp1(bq1; bq2)
@q2
= c0(bq2). We use (11) to simplify, and show that Firm 2 sets its quality to be e¢ cient
for a consumer with valuation bv + h(bv)
1  h0(bv) . This is the second equation.
Proposition 1 presents remarkably simple equilibrium characterizations. The only di¤erence between
equilibrium qualities and those in the rst best stems from how Firm 2 chooses its quality. Firm 2s consumers
have average valuation
R vbv xf(x)dx
1  F (bv) , which should be set to the marginal cost of Firm 2s quality for social
e¢ ciency. However, Firm 2s prot-maximization objective leads it to set quality so that the marginal cost
is equal to bv + h(bv)
1  h0(bv) . Our next result gives a class of valuation distributions for which the answer is
a¢ rmative. First, we present a mathematical lemma, which, through a simple application of integration by
parts, allows us to write the conditional expectation of valuations in terms of inverse hazard rate and the
density.
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Lemma 3 For any distribution F (and its corresponding density f and inverse hazard rate h  (1 F )=f),Z v
v
xf(x)dx
1  F (v)  v +
Z v
v
f(x)h(x)dx
f(v)h(v)
: (19)
Proposition 2 Suppose that the inverse hazard rate h is linear; that is, h(x) =   x, x 2 [v; v], for some
 and   0. Then for any v
v +
h(v)
1  h0(v) =
R v
v
xf(x)dx
1  F (v)  v +
R v
v
f(x)h(x)dx
f(v)h(v)
: (20)
Equilibrium qualities and market shares are rst best.
Proposition 2 exhibits a set of consumer valuation distributions for which the quality-price competition
game yields rst-best equilibrium qualities. We have managed to write the conditional average in terms of
the inverse hazard rate in Lemma 3, and this is bv + R vbv f(x)h(x)dx
f(bv)h(bv) . When the inverse hazard rate is linear,
h(bv)
1  h0(bv) 
R vbv f(x)h(x)dx
f(bv)h(bv) , Firm 2s prot-maximization incentive aligns with the social incentive. The
following remark gives the economic interpretation for the linear inverse hazard rate.
Remark 1 When Firm 2 sells to high-valuation consumers, its marginal revenue is linear in consumer
valuation if and only if h(v) is linear.
The hazard rate has gured prominently in information economics and auction theory (see, for instance,
Krishna (2009), La¤ont and Tirole (1993), Myerson (1997)), and measures information rent, or virtual val-
uation. Here, in quality-price competition, its role is in how a private rms quality changes the rival public
rms continuation equilibrium price. When the inverse hazard rate is linear, in auction and bargaining
theory, strategies become linear and tractability is available (see Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983), Gre-
sik (1991), and Satterthwaite and Williams (1989)). Here, linear inverse hazard rate implies e¢ ciency in
equilibrium qualities.
We can use the di¤erential equation [1  F (v)]=f(v) =   v to solve for the valuation density.
Remark 2 Suppose that h(x) =  x. Then if  = 0, f is the exponential distribution f(x) = A

exp( x

),
with v = 1, and A = exp( v

), so when v = 0, f(x) =
1

exp( x

) for x 2 R+. If  > 0, then f(x) =
15
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
(  x)(1 )
(  v)
 1

, with    v = 0. For the uniform distribution, we have h(x) = v   x (so  = v, and
 = 1).
Although equilibrium qualities are e¢ cient when the inverse hazard rate is linear, Remark 2 shows that
the set of valuation densities with linear inverse hazard rate is quite special even among the set of two-
parameter densities. The inverse hazard rate is unlikely to be linear for a randomly chosen distribution: the
e¢ ciency result in Proposition 2 may not be generic. What happens to qualities when they are ine¢ cient?
Our next result addresses that.
Proposition 3 Let an equilibrium be written as (bq1; bq2; bv), corresponding to Firm 1s quality, Firm 2s
quality, and the marginal consumer. If the equilibrium is not rst best, either
(bq1; bq2; bv) < (q` ; qh; v) or (bq1; bq2; bv) > (q` ; qh; v):
That is, when equilibrium qualities are not rst best, either both rms have equilibrium qualities lower than
the corresponding rst-best levels, or both have equilibrium qualities correspondingly higher.
The proposition can be explained as follows. Firm 1 aims to maximize social surplus. If Firm 2 chooses
q2 = q

h, Firm 1s best response is to pick q1 = q

` . Next, Firm 1s best response is increasing in q2. This
stems from the properties of bv(q1; q2), the e¢ cient allocation of consumers across the two rms. Quality q1
is too low for consumer bv, whereas quality q2 is too high. If q2 increases, consumer bv would become worse
o¤ buying from Firm 2, so actually bv increases. This also means that Firm 1 should raise its quality because
it now serves consumers with higher valuations. In other words, if Firm 2 raises its quality, Firm 1s best
response is to raise quality. Therefore, Firm 1s quality is higher than the rst best q` if and only if Firm
2s quality is higher than the rst best qh.
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We can rewrite the equation for Firm 2s equilibrium quality choice as follows:
v +
2664
Z v
v
f(x)h(x)dx
f(v)h(v)
 
Z v
v
f(x)h(x)dx
f(v)h(v)
3775+ h(v)1  h0(v) = c0(q2)
8>><>>:
h(v)
1  h0(v)  
Z v
v
f(x)h(x)dx
f(v)h(v)
9>>=>>;+
R v
v
xf(x)dx
1  F (v) = c
0(q2):
The term inside the curly brackets is the discrepancy in the characterization of the rst-best high quality
and Firm 2s equilibrium quality. We have provided a condition for this term to be zero in Proposition 2,
but this cannot be expected to hold for most distributions. The property of this term will then determine
the distortion described in Proposition 3.
We have constructed a number of examples to verify that equilibrium qualities can be either below or
above the rst best. However, it is more e¤ective if we discuss these examples after we have presented the
other class of equilibria in which the public rm chooses a higher quality than the private rm. The examples
are presented in Subsection 4.3. Also, we will defer robustness and policy discussions until after we have
presented the other class of equilibria, in Subsections 5.1 and 5.2.
4 Equilibria with high quality at public rm
Because the two rms have di¤erent objectives, equilibria in this class are not isomorphic to those in the
previous section. However, the logic of the analysis is similar to the previous subsections, so we will omit
proofs (but some can be found in Laine and Ma (2016)).
4.1 Subgame-perfect equilibrium prices
When q1 > q2, the rms have positive demand only if p1 > p2. Now, consumers with high valuations buy
from the public rm. We now write the denition of the indi¤erent consumer ev as:
evq1   p1 = evq2   p2 or ev(p1; p2; q1; q2) = p1   p2
q1   q2 : (21)
Firm 1 and 2s payo¤s are, respectively, social surplus and prot:Z ev
v
[xq2   c(q2)]f(x)dx+
Z v
ev [xq1   c(q1)]f(x)dx and F (ev)[p2   c(q2)]:
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Equilibrium prices, (bp1; bp2), are best responses against each other, and characterized in the following lemma.
Lemma 4 In subgames (q1; q2) with q1 > q2, and v <
c(q1)  c(q2)
q1   q2 < v, equilibrium prices (bp1; bp2) are:
bp1   c(q1) = bp2   c(q2) = (q1   q2)F (bv)
f(bv)  (q1   q2)k(bv); (22)
where bv = c(q1)  c(q2)
q1   q2 : (23)
Firm 1 implements the socially e¢ cient consumer allocation by setting a price di¤erential equal to the cost
di¤erential, whereas Firm 2s prot maximization follows the usual marginal-revenue-marginal-cost tradeo¤,
which is now related to the inverse reverse hazard rate, k = F=f . Equilibrium prices, bp1(q1; q2), bp2(q1; q2)
change with qualities in the following way.
Lemma 5 From the denition of (bp1; bp2) in (22) and (23), we have bv increasing in q1 and q2,
@bp1(q1; q2)
@q2
=  k(bv) + k0(bv) [bv   c0(q2)] , (24)
@bp2(q1; q2)
@q2
= c0(q2)  k(bv) + k0(bv) [bv   c0(q2)] : (25)
Unlike subgames where Firm 2s quality is higher than Firm 1s, Firm 2s market share increases with
both q1 and q2. However, the e¤ect of a higher quality q2 on prices may be ambiguous, but the e¤ect of q2
on bp2 is larger than that on bp1 by c0(q2).
4.2 Subgame-perfect equilibrium qualities
Equilibrium qualities (bq1; bq2) are mutual best responses, given continuation equilibrium prices:
bq1 = argmax
q1
Z bv(q1;bq2)
v
[xbq2   c(bq2)]f(x)dx+ Z vbv(q1;bq2)[xq1   c(q1)]f(x)dx (26)bq2 = argmax
q2
F (bv(bq1; q2))[bp2(bq1; q2)  c(q2)]; (27)
where bp2 is Firm 2s equilibrium price and bv is the equilibrium indi¤erent consumer (see Lemma 4).
We apply the same method to characterize equilibrium qualities. Changing q1 in Firm 1s payo¤ in (26)
only a¤ects the second integral there because the e¤ect via the rst integral is second order by the Envelope
Theorem. Changing q2 has only two e¤ects: the direct e¤ect on the surplus of the marginal consumer
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bvq   c(q2), and the e¤ect on Firm 1s equilibrium price, because any e¤ect on the marginal consumer is
second order according to the Envelope Theorem. We obtain the rst-order conditions
Z v
bv(q1;q2)[x  c
0(q1)]f(x)dx = 0 and bv(bq1; q2)  c0(q2) + @bp1(bq1; q2)
@q2
= 0:
After applying Lemma 5 to the last rst-order condition, we obtain the following.
Proposition 4 Equilibrium qualities (bq1,bq2), and the marginal consumer bv solve the following three equations
in q1, q2, and v Z v
v
xf(x)dx
1  F (v) = c
0(q1)
v   k(v)
1 + k0(v)
= c0(q2)
vq2   c(q2) = vq1   c(q1):
Proposition 4 shares the same intuition behind Proposition 1. Firm 1 chooses q1 to maximize the surplus
of those consumers with valuations higher than bv. Firm 2 chooses the quality that is e¢ cient for a type
lower than the marginal consumer, at valuation bv   k(bv)
1 + k0(bv) . Firm 2s lower quality serves to use product
di¤erentiation to create a bigger cost di¤erential, and hence a bigger price di¤erential between the two rms.
We can identify a class of distributions for which Firm 2s prot incentive aligns with the social incentive.
An intermediate result is the following.
Lemma 6 For any distribution F (and its corresponding density f and inverse reverse hazard rate k  F=f),Z v
v
xf(x)dx
F (v)
 v  
Z v
v
f(x)k(x)dx
f(v)k(v)
: (28)
Proposition 5 Suppose that the inverse reverse hazard rate k is linear; that is, k(x) =  + x, x 2 [v; v],
for some  and   0. Then for any v
v   k(v)
1 + k0(v)
=
Z v
v
xf(x)dx
F (v)
 v  
Z v
v
f(x)k(x)dx
f(v)k(v)
: (29)
Equilibrium qualities and market shares are rst best.
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The following two remarks, respectively, relate the linear inverse reverse hazard rate to the private rms
marginal revenue, and present the corresponding densities.
Remark 3 When Firm 2 sells to low-valuation consumers, its marginal revenue is linear in consumer
valuation if and only if k(v) is linear.
Remark 4 Suppose that k(x) =  + x. Then  > 0, and f(x) =

( + x)1 
( + v)
 1

with  + v = 0. For the
uniform distribution,  =  v and  = 1.
Again, the above shows that densities that have linear reverse hazard rates constitute a small class.
Generically, ine¢ cient equilibrium qualities can be expected. When the equilibrium is not rst best, the
distortion in equilibria with higher public qualities exhibits the same pattern as in equilibria with lower
public qualities: Proposition 3 holds verbatim for the class of high-public-quality equilibria: either both
rms produce qualities higher than rst best, or both produce qualities lower than rst best.
4.3 Examples and comparisons between equilibrium and rst-best qualities
Propositions 2, 3, and 5 point to a rich set of equilibrium qualities, which are often ine¢ cient. Here, we
construct a number of illustrative examples. We assume a quadratic cost function c(q) = 12q
2. We consider
six valuation distributions: two for each of triangular, truncated exponential, and beta distributions. For
each distribution, we look at low-public-quality and high-public-quality equilibria. Diagrams 1-3 present the
equilibrium qualities and social surpluses. (In each diagram, we mark the equilibrium and rst-best qualities
on a line, and write down the corresponding social surpluses to the right of the qualities.) Formulas of the
inverse hazard and inverse reverse hazard rates and Mathematica programs are in the Supplement.
Example 1 A triangular distribution f(v) = 2v, and its reverse f(v) = 2(1  v), v 2 [0; 1].
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Diagram 1: Equilibria for triangular valuation distributions
Example 1 shows the possibility of the rst best. However, where equilibria are ine¢ cient, qualities may be
higher or lower than rst best.
Example 2 A truncated exponential distribution f(v) = [exp( v=)]=1 exp( v=) , and its reverse f(v) =
[exp( (v v)=)]=
1 exp( v=) ,
 = 20, and v 2 [0; v] = [0; 100].
Diagram 2: Equilibria for truncated exponential valuation distributions
Example 2 shows that for the exponential distribution, equilibrium qualities must always be higher than
rst best, but for the reverse exponential distribution, equilibrium qualities must always be lower. The
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low-public-quality equilibrium yields a higher social surplus in the exponential distribution, but the reverse
is true with the reverse exponential distribution.
Example 3 Two beta distributions: f(v) = v
( 1)(1 v)( 1)R 1
0
x( 1)(1 x)( 1)dx , v 2 [0; 1], (; ) = (2; 5) and (; ) =
(5; 2).
Diagram 3: Equilibria for beta valuation distributions
In Example 3, for each beta distribution, qualities are higher than rst best in one equilibrium, but lower in
the other. For the beta(2,5) distribution, the low-public-quality equilibrium yields a higher social surplus,
but the revese is true for the beta(5,2) distribution.
5 Policies, robustness, and existence of equilibria
5.1 Competition policy
Suppose that the market initially consists of two private rms, so equilibrium qualities are ine¢ cient. Qual-
ities improve when one private rm is taken over by a public rm. Example 1 shows that for triangular and
reverse triangular distributions, full e¢ ciency can be restored if the public rm enters at the correct quality
segment. Examples 2 and 3 show that generally low-public-quality and high-public-quality equilibria yield
di¤erent social surpluses. Hence, entry by the public rm at the correct market segment is important. Our
characterizations in Propositions 1 and 4 provide guidance.
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Commitment by the public rm has been a common assumption in the previous literature. Equilibrium
qualities are rst best in the simultaneous-move games if and only if they are rst best in the Stackelberg
game, one in which the public rm can commit to quality or price. The reason is this. Suppose that
Stackelberg equilibrium qualities are rst best. Because the public rms payo¤ is social surplus, the (rst-
best) low quality is a best response against the private rms (rst-best) high quality, so commitment is
unnecessary. The converse is trivially true.
From Proposition 3, the improvement in welfare from a Stackelberg game comes from the public rm
choosing a quality closer to the rst best. For example, if in an equilibrium, qualities are lower than the rst
best (as in the reverse truncated exponential distribution case in Example 2), a higher public quality leads
to a higher best response by the private rm, so both qualities will become closer to the rst best.
5.2 General objective for the public rm and subsidies
So far our focus has been on quality e¢ ciency. The public rms objective function has been social welfare.
Prices are transfers between consumers and rms, so do not a¤ect social welfare. A more general objective
function for a public rm can be a weighted sum of consumer surplus, and prots, also a common assumption
in the literature. In this case, we can rewrite Firm 1s objective function as

(Z ev
v
[xq1   p1]f(x)dx+
Z v
ev [xq2   p2]f(x)dx
)
+ (1  ) fF (ev)[p1   c(q1)] + [1  F (ev)][p2   c(q2)]g . (30)
Here, consumers are paying for the lower quality q1 at price p1, and the higher quality q2 at price p2. The
weight on consumer surplus is  >
1
2
, whereas the weight on prots is 1  , so prots are unattractive from
a social perspective. We can rewrite (30) as

(Z ev
v
[xq1   c(q1)]f(x)dx+
Z v
ev [xq2   c(q2)]f(x)dx
)
  (2   1) fF (ev)[p1   c(q1)] + [1  F (ev)][p2   c(q2)]g ;
which always decreases in Firm 1s price. If we impose a balanced-budget constraint, then the public rm
must set price p1 at marginal cost c(q1) to break even.
Lemmas 1 and 4 can no longer be valid. The rst best cannot be an equilibrium because consumers do
not bear the full incremental cost between high and low qualities. Suppose that q2 > q1: The public rm
will reduce price p1 to marginal cost c(q1). However, in any price equilibrium, Firm 2s prot-maximizing
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price-cost margin has p2   c(q2) > 0, so we have p2   p1 > c(q2)   c(q1). Fewer consumers will use the
high-quality private rm.
We can regard the public rms social-surplus preferences as a normative recommendation; otherwise, the
distribution of consumers among rms will be ine¢ cient. The concern for distribution should be addressed
by a subsidy. Firms earn prots, according to Lemmas 1 and 4. Consider a low-public-quality equilibrium.
Let equilibrium prices be bp1 and bp2. Impose taxes on Firms 1 and 2, respectively, at F (bv)[bp1   c(q1)] and
[1   F (bv)][bp2   c(q2)], where bv is in (10). The total tax revenue can be used as a consumer subsidy. For
example, it can be equally distributed to all consumers, or be set up as a voucher for buying from either rm,
or paid to consumers according to other criteria (say consumers with lower valuations get more). The only
requirement is that the subsidy does not alter the di¤erence of rmsprices, so that p2   p1 = c(q2)  c(q1),
a necessary condition for the rst best.
5.3 Di¤erent cost functions for public and private rms
We now let rms have di¤erent cost functions. Let c1(q) and c2(q) be Firm 1s and Firm 2s unit cost at
product quality q, and these functions are increasing and convex.6 The analysis in Sections 3 and 4 remains
exactly the same. Simply replace every c(q1) by c1(q1) and every c(q2) by c2(q2). In the price subgame, the
equilibrium still has a price di¤erence equal to cost di¤erence: p2   p1 = c2(q2)   c1(q1). The equilibrium
qualities continue to satisfy their respective conditions after rst-order conditions are simplied.
Propositions 2 and 5 have to be adjusted. This is because the rst best in Subsection 2.3 has to be
redened. There are now two ways to assign technology. In one, low-valuation consumers pay the cost c1(q`)
for the low quality q`, and high-valuation consumers incur the cost c2(qh) for the high quality qh. In the
other, it is the opposite. One of these technology assignments will yield a higher social welfare. However,
our abstract model does not allow us to determine which technology should be used for low quality.7
6Often the public rm is assumed to be less e¢ cient. For example, we can let c1(q) > c2(q) and c01(q) > c
0
2(q), so
both unit and marginal unit costs are higher at the public rm. Our formal model, however, does not require this
particular comparative advantage.
7As an illustration, let c1(q) = (1+s)c(q), and c2(q) = (1 s)c(q). The social welfare from using c1 to produce the
low quality is
R v
v
[xq`   (1 + s)c(q`)]f(x)dx+
R v
v
[xqh   (1  s)c(qh)]f(x)dx. At s = 0, this is the model in Subsection
2.1. From the Envelope Theorem, the derivative of the maximized welfare with respect to s, evaluated at s = 0, is
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The likelihood that the rst best is achieved by the public rm taking over a private rm is small, again
because linear inverse hazard and reverse hazard rates are nongeneric. The relevant question is whether the
public rm should enter the low-quality segment or high-quality segement. Our examples for the case of
identical cost functions show that the answer depends on the model specics. This conclusion for competition
policy should remain valid when costs are di¤erent.
5.4 Consumer outside option and many private rms
The consumer having an outside option is the same as introducing a ctitious rm o¤ering a product at zero
quality and zero price. In the rst best, some consumers with very low valuations may not consume. The
public rms price a¤ects decisions of two marginal consumers: the one who choose between the low-quality
good and the high-quality good, and the one who choose between the low-quality good and no consumption
at all.
In fact, Delbono et al. (1996) show that under a uniform valuation distribution, the rst best is not an
equilibrium. E¢ cient allocation requires that all consumers face price di¤erentials equal to cost di¤erentials.
Hence, if Firm 1 produces a low quality q1 and Firm 2 produces a high quality q2, then e¢ ciency requires
p2   p1 = c(q2)   c(q1). When p2 > c(q2) due to Firm 2s market power, p1 > c (q1). However, to induce
consumers to make e¢ cient nonpurchase decisions, p1 should be set at c(q1).
The case of many private rms is formally very similar. When a public rm has to interact with, say,
two private rms, it does not have enough instruments to induce e¢ cient decisions. Suppose that there are
three rms, and that the medium quality is produced by a public rm, whereas the private rms produce
low and high qualities. The public rm cannot simultaneously use one price to induce two e¢ cient margins.
5.5 Existence of equilibria
In the previous sections, we have assumed the existence of equilibria. We now write down conditions for the
solutions in Propositions 1 and 4 to be mutual best responses. For this, we consider two types of deviations:
the partial derivative of welfare with respect to s:  c(q` )F (v) + c(qh)[1  F (v)]. Properties of q` , qh, and v from
(3), (4), and (5) do not indicate whether this derivative is positive or negative. It appears that the distribution F
and the cost functions may interact in many ways.
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i) a rm choosing a lower quality than the rivals, and ii) a rm choosing a higher quality than the rivals.
Let L(q1)  max
q2q1
F (bv(q1; q2))[bp2(q1; q2)   c(q2)], where bv(q1; q2) = [c(q1)   c(q2)]=[q1   q2]. Here,
Firm 2 gets low-valuation consumers and the continuation equilibrium prot L(q1). Using the Envelope
Theorem, we can show that L(q1) is strictly increasing.8 If Firm 2 must choose only qualities that are
lower than q1, it benets more when q1 is higher because it has a bigger choice set. Let U (q1)  max
q2q1
[1 
F (bv(q1; q2))][bp2(q1; q2) c(q2)]. Now, Firm 2 gets the high-valuation consumers and the prot U (q1). Again,
using the Envelope Theorem, we can show that U (q1) is strictly decreasing. Firm 2s maximum prots from
a continuation equilibrium is the upper envelope of L(q1) and U (q1), maxfL(q1); U (q1)g. Dene q1 by
L(q1) = U (q1). The critical value q1 exists and is unique. It is a best response for Firm 2 to choose a high
quality if and only if Firm 1s quality is below the critical value q1.
Next, for Firm 1s best response, we let sL(q2)  max
q1q2
R bv(q1;q2)
v
[xq1   c(q1)]f(x)dx +
R vbv(q1;q2)[xq2  
c(q2)]f(x)dx. This is the maximum social surplus when Firm 1s quality is lower than Firm 2s. Similarly,
let sU (q2)  max
q1q2
R bv(q1;q2)
v
[xq2   c(q2)]f(x)dx +
R vbv(q1;q2)[xq1   c(q1)]f(x)dx, the maximum social surplus
when Firm 1s quality is higher than Firm 2s. Again, using the Envelope Theorem, we show that sL(q2) is
strictly increasing, and sH(q2) is strictly decreasing. Dene q2 by sL(q2) = sU (q2). It is a best response for
Firm 1 to choose a low quality if and only if Firm 2s quality is above the critical value q2.
Formally, the low-public-quality equilibrium exists when the equations in Proposition 1 yield a solution
(bq1; bq2) satisfying bq1 < q1 and bq2 > q2. Similarly, the high-public-quality equilibrium exists when the
equations in Proposition 4 yield a solution (bq1; bq2) satisfying bq1 > q1 and bq2 < q2. However, we are unaware
of general conditions on f and c for these requirements.
To conrm the existence of particular equilibria, however, we only need to verify that candidate equilib-
rium qualities are mutual best responses. For the f(v) = 2v triangular distribution example above, we have
computed each players payo¤s. Given the private rms quality q2 set at a (candidate) equilibrium level,
8The derivative of L(q1) is the partial derivative of the prot function with respect to q1 evaluated at the prot-
maximizing q2. This is f(bv)[bp2   c(q2)] @bv
@q1
+ F (bv)@bp2
@q1
. We obtain
@bp2
@q1
from (22) in Lemma 4. We verify that both
@bv
@q1
and
@bp2
@q1
are positive, and conclude that L(q1) is strictly increasing. The monotonicity of H(q1), sL(q2), and
sH(q2) can be demonstrated by similar computation.
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we compute the public rms payo¤s from setting quality q1 at levels below and above q2. We do the same
for the private rm given the public rms (candidate) equilibrium quality. We have conrmed, indeed, that
those qualities in the example form an equilibrium. The computation details are in the Supplement. (We
have also done the same for a model with v on a uniform distribution [10; 11] and a quadratic cost function.
The game has an equilibrium with qualities at 10:25 and 10:75.)
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have studied equilibria in a mixed duopoly. The public rm maximizes social surplus, and the
private rm maximizes prot. We have used a general distribution for consumers valuations and a general
cost function for rms. We discuss two classes of equilibria. In one class, the public rm o¤ers low quality
and the private o¤ers high quality. In the other class, the opposite is true. Whereas generically, equilibrium
qualities are ine¢ cient, when inverse hazard or inverse reverse hazard rates are linear, equilibrium qualities
are rst best. We have related our results to competition policies, and discussed various robustness issues.
Various directions for further research may be of interest. Clearly, duopoly is a limitation. However,
a mixed oligopoly with an arbitrary number of rms is analytically very di¢ cult. In the extant literature,
models of product di¤erentiation with many private rms typically impose very strong assumptions on either
consumer valuation (equivalently location) distribution or production cost (equivalently mismatch disutility).
The contribution here relies on our ability to identify the inverse hazard and inverse reverse hazard rates as
the determining factors for properties of equilibrium qualities. It may well be that they also turn out to be
useful for a richer model. The unit cost being constant with respect to quantity is a common assumption
in the literature. We have used the same constant-return approach. Scale e¤ects may turn out to be
important even for the mixed duopoly.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Consider bp2 = argmaxp2 [1   F (ev)][p2   c(q2)], where ev = p2   bp1q2   q1 (see (6)). The
rst-order derivative of the prot function with respect to p2 is
[1  F (ev)]  f(ev)[p2   c(q2)] 1
q2   q1
= h(ev)  [p2   c(q2)] 1
q2   q1 ;
where we have used the partial derivative of ev with respect to p2, namely 1=(q2   q1). From the assump-
tion that h is decreasing, the second-order derivative is negative, so the rst-order condition is su¢ cient.
Therefore, bp2 is given by bp2   c(q2) = (q2   q1)h(ev).
Next, consider Firm 1 choosing p1 to maximize (7) where ev = bp2   p1
q2   q1 (see (6)). Because (7) is indepen-
dent of p1, we can choose ev to maximize (7) ignoring (6). The optimal value bv is given by setting to zero the
rst-order derivative of (7) with respect to ev: bvq1  c(q1) = bvq2  c(q2). Then we simply choose bp1 to satisfy
(6) such that bv = bp2   bp1
q2   q1 =
c(q2)  c(q1)
q2   q1 . We have shown that bp1 and bp2 in (9) and (10) are mutual best
responses.
Proof of Lemma 2: First, from (10), we obtain (q2 q1)dbv+bv(dq2 dq1) = c0(q2)dq2 c0(q1)dq1, which,
together with the convexity of c, yields
@bv
@q1
=
bv   c0(q1)
q2   q1 =
1
q2   q1

c(q2)  c(q1)
q2   q1   c
0(q1)

> 0 (31)
@bv
@q2
=
c0(q2)  bv
q2   q1 =
1
q2   q1

c0(q2)  c(q2)  c(q1)
q2   q1

> 0: (32)
Next, from (9), we obtain
dbp1   c0(q1)dq1 = (dq2   dq1)h(bv) + (q2   q1)h0(bv) @bv
@q2
dq2   @bv
@q1
dq1

dbp2   c0(q2)dq2 = (dq2   dq1)h(bv) + (q2   q1)h0(bv) @bv
@q2
dq2   @bv
@q1
dq1

:
We then use (31) and (32) to simplify these, and obtain
@bp1(q1; q2)
@q2
= h(bv) + h0(bv) [c0(q2)  bv]
@bp2(q1; q2)
@q2
= c0(q2) + h(bv) + h0(bv) [c0(q2)  bv] ;
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which are the expressions in the lemma.
Proof of Proposition 1: The rst-order derivative of (13) with respect to q1 is
Z bv(q1;q2)
v
[x  c0(q1)]f(x)dx+ f[bv(q1; q2)q1   c(q1)]  [bv(q1; q2)q2   c(q2)]g f(bv(q1; q2)) @bv
@q1
:
By Lemma 1, the term inside the curly brackets is zero. By putting this rst-order derivative to zero, we
obtain the rst equation in the Proposition. Also, because equilibrium prices bp1(q1; q2) and bp2(q1; q2) must
follow Lemma 1, we have
bv(q1; q2) = c(q2)  c(q1)
q2   q1 ;
which is the last equation in the Proposition.
Next, we use (17) to obtain the rst-order derivative of Firm 2s prot with respect to q2:
[1  F (bv(q1; q2))] bv(q1; q2)  c0(q2) + @bp1(q1; q2)
@q2

+
f f(bv(q1; q2))[bp2(bq1; q2)  c(q2)] + [1  F (bv(q1; q2))](q2   q1)g @bv(q1; q2)
@q2
:
Again, by Lemma 1, the term inside the curly bracket is zero. After setting the rst-order derivative to 0,
we obtain
bv(q1; q2)  c0(q2) + @bp1(q1; q2)
@q2
= 0:
We then use (11) in Lemma 2 to substitute for
@bp1(q1; q2)
@q2
, and write the rst-order condition as
bv   c0(q2) + h(bv) + h0(bv) [c0(q2)  bv] = 0;
which simplies to
bv + h(bv)
1  h0(bv) = c0(q2);
the second equation in the Proposition.
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Proof of Lemma 3: By denition, f(x)h(x) = (1  F (x)). We haveR v
v
xf(x)dx
1  F (v)
=  
R v
v
xd(1  F (x))
f(v)h(v)
=
v(1  F (v))
f(v)h(v)
+
R v
v
(1  F (x))dx
f(v)h(v)
= v +
R v
v
f(x)h(x)dx
f(v)h(v)
;
where the second equality is due to integration by parts.
Proof of Proposition 2: Suppose that h(x) =   x. We have, h0(x) =  , and
v +
h(v)
1  h0(v) = v +
  v
1 + 
=
v + 
1 + 
:
Then we compute
v +
R v
v
f(x)h(x)dx
f(v)h(v)
= v +
R v
v
f(x)(  x)dx
f(v)h(v)
= v +
[1  F (v)]
f(v)h(v)
  
R v
v
xf(x)dx
f(v)h(v)
= v +   
(
v +
R v
v
f(x)h(x)dx
f(v)h(v)
)
;
where the expression in the curly brackets comes from the identity (19). Simplifying, we have
v +
R v
v
f(x)h(x)dx
f(v)h(v)
=
v + 
1 + 
:
We have proved (20).
The three equations in Proposition 1 are now exactly those that dene the rst best in (3), (4), and (5).
Equilibrium qualities and consumer allocation must be rst best.
Proof of Remark 1: When Firm 2 sells to consumers with valuations above v at price p2, its revenue
is [1 F (v)]p2, where v = p2   p1
q2   q1 . If we express p2 as a function of v, we have p2(v) = p1+ v(q2  q1). The
marginal revenue is the derivative of revenue with respect to the rms quantity, [1  F (v)]:
d[1  F (v)]p2(v)
d[1  F (v)]
= p2(v) + [1  F (v)] dp2(v)d[1  F (v)] = p2(v) + [1  F (v)]
dp2(v)=dv
d[1  F (v)]=dv
= p2(v)  1  F (v)
f(v)
dp2(v)
dv
= p2(v)  h(v)(q2   q1):
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Because p2(v) is linear in v, marginal revenue is linear in v if and only if the inverse hazard rate h(v) is
linear.
Proof of Remark 2: Dene y  1   F , so y0 =  f . We have h(x) =    x equivalent to y
0
y
=
 1
  x . First, suppose that  = 0. We have
y0
y
=
 1

, so y(v) = A exp(  v

), some A. Therefore,
F (v) = 1   A exp(  v

). Because we have F (v) = 0, we must have A = exp(
v

). We also have F (v) = 1,
which requires v =1.
Second, suppose that  > 0. We have
y0
y
=
 1
  v . Solving this di¤erential equation, we have y (v) =
A(   v)
1
 , for some constant A. Hence, F (v) = 1   A(   v)
1
 , and we obtain the expression for f in
the Remark by di¤erentiation. Because F (v) = 0, we have A = (   v)
 
1
 . Because F (v) = 1, we must
have   v = 0, so that  and  cannot be arbitrary.
Proof of Proposition 3: For any q2 we consider Firm 1s best response function:
eq1(q2) = argmax
q1
Z bv(q1;q2)
v
[xq1   c(q1)]f(x)dx+
Z v
bv(q1;q2)[xq2   c(q2)]f(x)dx:
First, at q2 = qh, we have eq1(qh) = q` . Clearly, if Firm 2 chooses qh, from the denition of the rst best,
Firm 1s best response is q1 = q` because Firm 1 aims to maximize social surplus. It follows that the rst
best belongs to the graph of Firm 1s best response function.
Second, we establish that eq1(q2) is increasing in q2. The sign of the derivative of eq1(q2) has the same sign
of the cross partial derivative of Firm 1s objective function (13) evaluated at q1 = eq1(q2). The derivative of
(13) with respect to q1 is simply Z bv(q1;q2)
v
[x  c0(q1)]f(x)dx
because the partial derivative with respect to bv is zero. The cross partial is then obtained by di¤erentiating
the above with respect to q2, and this gives
[bv(q1; q2)  c0(q1)]f(bv)@bv(q1; q2)
@q2
> 0;
where the inequality follows because at q1 = eq1(q2), we have bv(q1; q2) > c0(q1) and @bv
@q2
> 0 by (32) in the
proof of Lemma 2.
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	Laine	and	Ma:	“Quality	and	Competition	between	Public	and	Private	Firms”			
• Equilibria	of	a	quality-price	game	between	public	and	private	firms	are	characterized.	
• The	public	firm	maximizes	social	surplus;	the	private	firm	maximizes	profits.	
• In	some	equilibria,	quality	is	higher	in	the	public	firm;	in	others,	the	opposite	is	true.		
• Equilibrium	qualities	are	often	inefficient,	but	are	first	best	under	some	conditions.	
• Equilibrium	characterizations	provide	basis	for	competition	and	subsidy	policies.		
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